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It is like "the rolling of a snowball, [that] increaseth in bulk in every age,
until it become utterly unmanageable. "'
Today there is an "alarming prospect" that the common law2 will be
"crushed by its own weight."3 There is a fear that "multiplied judicial utter-
ances have become a menace to orderly administration of the law."4 These "ut-
terances" are judicial opinions5 that create the "heart of the common law sys-
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I David Greenwald & Frederick A. 0. Scharz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 1133, 1145 (2002) (quoting a metaphor regarding the increase of case law
made by the Lord Chief Justice, Sir Matthew Hale, during the late 17th Century).
2 Judge Richard Posner expansively defines common law as "any body of law created
primarily by judges through their decisions." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE 247 (1990); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S]
(defining common law as the "body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from
statutes or constitutions").
3 Marla Brooke Tusk, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1202, 1209 (2003).
4 Thatch v. Livingston, 56 P.2d 549, 549-50 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
5 An opinion is a "court's written statement explaining its decision in a given case, ...
[usually] including the statement of facts, points of law, rationale, and dicta." BLACK'S,
supra note 2, at 1125.
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tem"--a common law system claiming to be dependent upon precedent.7
Challenged on a number of occasions,' this system of precedent is most re-
cently criticized on the ground that the rampant reliance on cumulative prece-
dent actually weakens the judicial system. Specifically, some note that "a large
proportion of the opinions that have been coming out of American courts add
essentially nothing to the corpus of law."9 It is a simple case of "too much writ-
ten material creating too little new law."'
Because of this voluminous problem, judges began employing techniques to
dispose of cases that they deemed unworthy of precedential value by utilizing
case-specific dispute resolution" to replace the regurgitation of legal principles
that previous opinions had already established. This approach aspired to curb
the issuance of redundant opinions while still determining the merits of the
case for the parties involved.
Despite this method's efficiency of case disposal management, it could not
6 John Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-The Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 59, 59 (1963) (referring to opinions as "the measure of the past and the guidepost of the
future, the guarantee of continuity and the barometer of change").
7 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 377
(1833), quoted in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2000), va-
cated as moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (declaring that the
case alone, is not considered "decided and settled," but rather the principles of the decision
are held as precedents and authority to bind future cases of the same nature);
This is the constant practice under our whole system of jurisprudence. Our ancestors
brought it with them, when they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always
has been considered, as the great security of our rights, our liberties, and our property.
It is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent
principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of judges.
Id.; BLACK'S, supra note 2, at 1214 (defining precedent as an adjudication process that em-
ploys the use of prior decisions as "a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts
or issues").
8 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-1002 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (maintaining that a system of precedent is a policy for the judicial system to
follow and not a constitutional mandate). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating
Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?,
109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000) (arguing for a complete break from the doctrine of stare decisis
for certain classes of cases).
9 PAUL D. CARRINGTON, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 35 (1976) (arguing that many written opin-
ions are only of interest and significance to the parties).
10 Boyce F. Martin, In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 177
(1999).
1 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 3 (1985) ("In every
case the court must determine what the facts are and what their legal significance is. If the
court determines their legal significance by applying an existing rule of law unchanged, it is
engaged in pure dispute resolution. But if to resolve the dispute the court must create a new
rule or modify an old one, that is law creation."); Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation
Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate
Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 235, 248 (1998) (listing the two func-
tions of an appellate court decision: dispute resolution and law-making).
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single-handedly meet the demand that increasing litigation placed on the judi-
ciary. All federal appellate courts implemented an informal non-publication
policy in response to the dramatic and crippling surge in the appellate caseload
during the 1960s.' 2 During this era, the courts experienced an exponential
growth in administrative agency claims as well as an increase in the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.'3 Nevertheless, it was not until a decade later that courts
began to adopt formal rules of procedure regarding non-publication. 4
Originally designed to make the judicial opinions inaccessible to the public
by excluding them from the bound volumes of the Federal Reporter, non-
publication plans'5 also had the advantage of limiting the amount of redundant
case law that litigants had to consume prior to trial. 6 By limiting the dissemi-
nation of certain opinions, the judiciary hoped to conserve its time and re-
sources in order to focus on more pressing issues.'7 Thus, unpublished opin-
ions" fulfilled several functions: they were provided only to the parties in-
volved in the litigation; 9 they did not require a complete recitation of the
12 U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES I I (1964) [hereinafter 1964 CONFERENCE REPORT].
13 AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, OPINIONS HIDDEN, CITATIONS FORBIDDEN: A REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS ON THE PUBLICA-
TION AND CITATION OF NONBINDING FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS 3 n.6 (2002) [herein-
after COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS], http://www.actl.com/PDFs/Opinions.pdf.
Other factors have also probably contributed to the burden on appellate judges: A be-
wildering array of new federal statutes, new crimes, and new rights of action; the
highly technical nature of much modem federal litigation; the advent of the jumbo
case-massive criminal conspiracy prosecutions, mass tort actions, and the like; the ar-
rival of technology that makes discovery (and perhaps appellate records) far more vo-
luminous than in the past, to name a few.
Id. See generally Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual
Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK L. REV. 685 (2001).
"4 U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12- 13 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT].
15 Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions:
Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 122 (1995).
16 Id.; see also IST CIR. R. 36(a) (noting a possible saving of "time and effort in research
on the part of future litigants" due to unpublished opinions).
17 See, e.g., lST CIR. R. 36(a) (allowing judges to issue unpublished opinions "in the
interests ... of expedition"); 2D CIR. R. 0.23 ("The demands of an expanding case load re-
quire the court to be ever conscious of the need to utilize judicial time effectively.").
18 An unpublished opinion is "considered binding on only the parties to the particular
case in which it is issued." BLACK'S, supra note 2, at 1125 (warning that "[c]ourt rules...
[usually] prohibit citing an unpublished opinion as authority").
19 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
APPELLATE JUSTICE 3 (1973) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION] ("[T]he judicial
time and effort essential for the development of an opinion to be published for posterity and
widely distributed is necessarily greater than that sufficient to enable a judge to provide a
statement so that the parties can understand the reason for the decision."); Niketh Velamoor,
Recent Development, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 to Require That
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facts; 2° they abrogated the need for careful attention to legalese;' and they ul-
timately eased the volumes of case law that simply disgorged tedious reitera-
tion of legal principles.2 Another non-publication policy that accompanies un-
published opinions is the use of no-citation rules.3 These rules generally pro-
hibit or restrict litigants from citing unpublished opinions to an appellate court
for all purposes.
Practitioners and scholars alike have voiced criticism over these policies.24
Critics rail over perceived violations of First Amendment protections and har-
bor suspicions that judges are creating a "secret law."25 They grumble over an
alleged missed opportunity to augment a legal argument while simultaneously
arguing that the authority to restrain precedent is outside the province of the
judiciary.26 This debate has caused many members of the judiciary to second-
guess their own policies and propose an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure ("FRAP"): Rule 32.1.
Proposed Rule 32.1 ("Rule" or "Proposed Rule" or "FRAP 32.1") creates a
uniform rule of citation for the federal courts of appeals.27 The Rule would re-
quire federal appellate courts to allow citation of judicial opinions designated
Circuits Allow Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 561, 563 (2004).
20 Martin, supra note 10, at 190 (prescribing the use of unpublished decisions only for
those cases where the area of law is well-settled and the case-at-bar merely involves a vari-
ant on those facts).
21 Velamoor, supra note 19, at 563 (attributing "lower-quality writing, reasoning, and
detail" to unpublished opinions).
22 Martin, supra note 10, at 178. ("Unpublished opinions act as a pressure valve in the
system, a way to pan for judicial gold while throwing the less influential opinions back into
the stream.").
23 Velamoor, supra note 19, at 562.
24 See generally Charles A. Babcock, No-Citation Rules: An Unconstitutional Prior
Restraint, 30:4 LITIGATION 33 (2004); Charles R. Eloshway, Say It Ain't So: Non-
Precedential Opinions Exceed the Limits of Article III Powers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632
(2002); Suzanne 0. Snowden, "That's My Holding and I'm Not Sticking To It! " Court Rules
That Deprive Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the Common Law, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 1253 (2001); Jon A. Strongman, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the
Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitu-
tional, 50 KAN. L. REV. 195 (2001); Tusk, supra note 3.
25 County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 938 (1985); see also Patricia M.
Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1371, 1374 (1995).
26 Carpenter, supra note 11, at 236.
27 "Some circuits freely permit such citation, some circuits disfavor such citation but
permit it in limited circumstances, and some circuits do not permit such citation under any
circumstances." Memorandum from Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Commit-
tee on Appellate Rules (May 22, 2003), http://www.nonpublication.com/newrule32.htm
[hereinafter Scircia Memorandum] (explaining how the circuits diverge in their treatment of
unpublished opinions when used for persuasive value).
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as unpublished in appellate briefs and oral arguments.2 ' Accordingly, FRAP
32.1 would ease the perceived hardship placed upon multi-jurisdictional practi-
tioners 9.2 Additionally, the Rule would remove all disciplinary actions3 as a
matter of policy 3' for failing to follow no-citation restrictions.
Many, however, argue that the Rule would be more burdensome than bene-
ficial. Judges denounce the Rule 32 because it will add to the already over-
whelming caseload of the federal appellate courts.33 Others believe that the
Rule will cause judges to spend more time drafting their written opinions for
fear that they will become legally binding.34 In turn, the increased time needed
to dispose of individual cases will create a forceful incentive to use summary
dispositions.
As a practical matter, practitioners assert that the labyrinth of differing rules
restricting citation and publication of appellate opinions is ripe with weak-
nesses. These shortcomings include, among other things, fostering unfairness
to litigants, diminishing judicial accountability,36 denying equal access to the
law, and violating the First Amendment.37
28 Id.
29 Id. (claiming that practitioners of more than one circuit may have trouble remember-
ing the different rules regarding citation in each circuit).
30 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-386R (1994) (stat-
ing that it was "ethically improper" for a lawyer to cite to an unpublished opinion in viola-
tion of that tribunal's court rules). But see ABA Resolution 01A1 15 (August 1, 2001),
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/cjpol.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005):
RESOLVED, THAT the American Bar Association opposes the practice of various
federal courts of appeal in prohibiting citation to or reliance upon their unpublished
opinions as contrary to the best interests of the public and the legal profession.
FURTHER RESOLVED, THAT the American Bar Association urges the federal
courts of appeals uniformly to:
(1) Take all necessary steps to make their unpublished decisions available through print
or electronic publications, publicly accessible media sites, CD-ROMs, and/or Internet
Websites; and
(2) Permit citation to relevant unpublished opinions.
Id.
31 Scircia Memorandum, supra note 27.
32 See generally Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Rule of Appellate Procedure
32.1, 51 FED. LAW. 36 (2004); Martin, supra note 10; Phillip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publica-
tion of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 909, 913 (1986).
33 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE 13 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 CONFERENCE REPORT],
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf.
34 Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 13 (2002)
(statement of Alex Kozinski, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
35 2004 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 13; see also Nat'l Classification Comm.
v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
36 David S. Tatel, Some Thoughts on Unpublished Opinions, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
815, 815 (1996).
37 Carpenter, supra note 11, at 236.
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In spite of these infirmities, the overall utility of this system is needed. Con-
sequently, this Comment argues that our federal appellate courts need a uni-
form rule regarding the publication of opinions to ensure that all litigants have
and receive equal access to a universal precedent. Furthermore, citation to un-
published opinions should remain restricted in order to maintain a coherent
body of law and authority pursuant to any publication plan.38
Part II of this Comment summarizes the relevant legal history leading up to
the use of the unpublished opinion as well as the advances in technology that
ultimately required the implementation of no-citation rules. Part III gives a
brief overview of the Judicial Conference's Proposed Amendment 32.1 to the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rationale behind its creation; it
also provides analysis of the Judicial Conference's argument for FRAP 32.1,
including fairness to the litigant. In Part IV, this Comment discusses the need
to balance judicial efficiency against the rights of parties; it further argues that
the judiciary needs a uniform publication plan instead of a uniform citation
plan if it is to ascertain the desired goal of a predictable and consistent body of
circuit case authority. Finally, Part V concludes by offering both predictions
and possible solutions to the ongoing debate.
II. A TIME TO OPINE
"Much would be gained if three-fourths (maybe nine-tenths) of... [the
opinions] published in the last twenty years were utterly destroyed. -39
The debates surrounding restrictions on the publication and citation of judi-
cial opinions originate from a legitimate concern regarding the maintenance of
a manageable, cohesive, and accessible body of law.' Although this debate has
38 Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 32.1,
FED. LAW., June 2004, at 37; see also Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opin-
ion: Unpublished Opinion and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals,
87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 944 (1989) ("In order to preserve the savings associated with nonpub-
lication . . . lawyers must be persuaded not to use unpublished opinions."); Melissa H.
Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An Uncomfortable Reality, 3 J. App.
PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 180 (2001) (concluding that the "reduced cost and increased judicial
efficiency ... [of limited publication would be] frustrated if citation to unpublished deci-
sions were permitted"). For a comprehensive list ofjurisdiction-specific citation rules across
all federal and state courts, see THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 27-42
(Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
39 Thatch v. Livingston, 56 P.2d 549, 549-50 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (reasoning that
the mountains of judicial opinions have merely created "confusion, and often contempt" and
have no place except in the "waste basket").
40 Martin, supra note 10, at 177 (describing the exponential growth of the Federal Re-




garnered much attention recently, it is not a novel paradigm.4 In 1777, Lord
Coke called for the limited publication of his native England's judicial opin-
ions in fear that the law books would "grow to be like elephantini libri, of infi-
nite length, and in mine opinion lose somewhat of their present authority and
reverence."42 In the United States as early as 1915, lawyers and judges feared
that they would be unable to stay current with the law as long as judicial opin-
ions proliferated. 3 Again in the 1940s, the Third and Fifth Circuits studied dif-
ferent plans that would decrease the number of published opinions.a
A. THE UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS BORN
Despite nearly 200 years of judicial uproar, it was not until the 1960s that
policymakers initiated discussion about limiting publication of judicial opin-
ions. 5 There was extensive concurrence among the circuits that "too many
opinions [were] being printed and published."' Indeed, most commonly be-
lieve that nearly all judicial opinions prior to this time were published.47
In 1964, the Judicial Conference of the United States48 ("Judicial Confer-
41 See Charles R. Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257; Charles A. Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Cir-
cuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REv. 949(1964).
42 See Greenwald & Schwarz, Jr., supra note 1, at 1144-45 (quoting Lord Coke who, in
1777, complained about the growth of law books yet, only thirty volumes of reported deci-
sions existed at that time).
43 William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168-69 (1978).
44 See generally Francis P. Whitehair, Opinions of Courts: Fifth Circuit Acts Against
Unneeded Publication, 33 A.B.A. J. 751 (1947); Opinions of Courts: Should Number Pub-
lished be Reduced?, 34 A.B.A. J. 668 (1948).
45 1964 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 11.
46 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 7-8 (1971).
47 Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 308 (1990) ("It is not known
how many decisions of the courts of appeals were not published before 1964, but apparently
the number was relatively small."); see also Michael Hannon, Developments and Practice
Notes, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J.
App. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 201 n. 13 (2001) (explaining how during the course of research
he performed on Lexis and Westlaw to determine the amount of unpublished opinions be-
fore 1970, he found very few).
48 The Judicial Conference of the United States is an annual conference of judges that
includes the chief judge of each circuit. The purpose of the Judicial Conference is to "pro-
mote uniformity of management procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business."
28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000). The Conference is authorized by Congress to study the "operation
and effect" of the rules of practice and procedure as well as recommend to the Supreme
Court any "changes in or additions to those rules ... [in order] to promote simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay." Id.
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ence" or "Conference") warned of the "difficulty and economic cost of estab-
lishing and maintaining accessible private and public law library facilities" in
light of the burgeoning number of published opinions;49 they called only for the
publication of opinions of "great precedential value."5 Seven years later, the
Federal Judicial Center' ("Judicial Center") created the Advisory Council on
Appellate Justice to study the appellate process. Based on the results, in 1972,
the Judicial Center called for national review and modification of all circuit
publication practices in order to reduce the number of published opinions, 2 and
further called for significant restrictions on the citation of unpublished opin-
ions. The Conference adopted these admonitions and recommended to each
circuit that they develop their own opinion-publication plan. 4
By 1974, all of the circuits had implemented some form of publication re-
striction. The Judicial Conference commented that these publication plans
were successfully reducing the superfluous publication of opinions.5 Although
the Conference raised concerns over the lack of uniformity in the publication
plans' requirements and procedures, there was hope "that further experimenta-
tion may well lead to the amendment of the diverse circuit plans and that even-
tually a somewhat more or less common plan might evolve."56 By all accounts,
authors of publication plans have succeeded in their goals; the federal courts of
appeals methodically reduced the number of published opinions such that al-
most 80% of all opinions are now unpublished. 7 Nevertheless, this long-
awaited "success" has incurred criticisms of its own.
Many contend unpublished opinions foster a reduction in judicial account-
ability. 8 Opponents complain that these opinions are merely a vehicle for
judges to bury decisions that may be contrary to public policy or deemed un-
49 1964 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 11.
50 Id.
51 Created in 1967 to "promote improvements in judicial administration," the Federal
Judicial Center researches federal court operations and procedures and provides ongoing
education to judges and various court employees. Federal Judicial Center,
http://www.fjc.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005).
52 BD. OF THE FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE APRIL 1972
SESSION OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THE PUBLICATION OF COURTS OF
APPEALS OPINIONS (1972) [hereinafter 1972 RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT].
53 Id.
54 U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 CONFERENCE REPORT]; see also
STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 19, at 18-19, 22-23. The Advisory Counsel on
Appellate Justice proposed a model rule for adoption by the circuit courts and advocated for
the prohibition on citation of unpublished opinions. Id.
55 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 12-13.
56 id. at 12.
57 See Strongman, supra note 24, at 195.
58 William L. Richman & William M. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Cer-
tiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273, 283 (1996).
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popular;59 hence, these decisions combine to create a "secret law."6 Many also
argue that unpublished opinions undermine a litigant's already limited power
of appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court by further eroding "the possibility of re-
view based upon a conflict among the circuits."'" In effect, these opinions often
convert the courts of appeals into "courts of last resort.
62
B. THE TECHNOLOGY BOOM
Copyright law bears no significance in the realm of publication63 of judicial
opinions.' Until the last quarter century, judicial opinions were only available
to the public in case reporters or at the courthouse.65 Therefore, the decision not
to physically publish a written judicial opinion meant that the opinion would
be publicly inaccessible.66 Alternately, an unpublished written opinion was
available only to the litigants of the case. With the advent of technology, the
decision not to physically publish an opinion ceased to be an effective block-
ade to the litigating population.67 Today, in addition to inclusion in bound vol-
umes, an unpublished opinion can also be "stored, accessed and retrieved in
digital form." '6
Consequently, the term unpublished opinion is a misnomer. These opinions
are, in fact, prepared and issued for public dissemination at a near exhaustive
level. For example, Lexis and Westlaw have archived the unpublished opinions
of nearly every circuit available,69 and they are also available in book format
59 "Sometimes I suspect that courts are designating certain opinions as unpublished
because they find them embarrassing, either due to the rulings they are rendering that are
patently unfair, or because the facts they are reciting in the opinion upset the judges due to
their sexual flavor." Arthur S. Leonard, Letters to the Editor, NAT'L L.J., July 15, 2002, at
A21 (referring to cases involving "lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered legal issues").
60 See Wald, supra note 25, at 1374; County of Los Angeles v. King, 474 U.S. 936, 938
(1985).
61 Reynolds & Richman, supra note 43, at 1203.
62 See Hannon, supra note 47, at 200.
63 Publication is "[t]he offering to distribute copies ... to a group of persons for pur-
poses of further distribution... or public display ... " 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
64 "[N]o reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this
court .... " Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834), as codified by 17 U.S.C. § 105
(2000) ("Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United
States Government ... ").
65 Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 541, 544 (1997).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. (including Internet services "such as Westlaw and Lexis").
69 The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits continue to withhold unpublished opinions from
Lexis and Westlaw. Stephen R. Barnett, From Anatasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appen-
dix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 1,6 (2002).
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through West's Federal Appendix." Furthermore, as of December 17, 2004,
federal law requires that all judicial opinions, published and unpublished, ren-
dered by a federal court be posted on that court's website.7" Today, "it is the
rare opinion that is not disseminated for mass consumption."7
This enhanced public accessibility has substantially changed the way the ju-
diciary perceives the term unpublished. When the court refers to its opinions as
unpublished, it is not referring to dispositions that are unavailable to the public,
but rather to those opinions where precedent or binding authority may be re-
stricted." The effect of categorizing an opinion as unpublished is to make it
subject to limitations, usually referred to as no-citation rules promulgated by
the courts of appeals. 4
In essence, the no-citation rules of today function as the equivalent of the
70 Id. at 2 (stating that the new case-reporter series was launched in September of 2001
and consisted "entirely of 'unpublished' opinions from the federal circuit courts of appeals
(except, currently, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits)"); see also Joseph L. Gerken, A Librar-
ian's Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 475, 475-76 (2004) (de-
scribing the Federal Appendix as "a new case reporter that print[s] the full text of 'unpub-
lished' opinions, complete with headnotes, topics, and key numbers . . .[and] is readily
available to any library patron familiar with the most fundamental of legal research skills,
using a digest to find cases by subject").
71 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913
(2003); see generally United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
http://www.cal.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005); United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005); Third Ju-
dicial Circuit, http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005); United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005);
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov (last vis-
ited Aug. 15, 2005); U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005); United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005); United
States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug.
15, 2005); United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005); U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, http://www.calO.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005); United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, http://www.cal 1 .uscourts.gov (last visited Aug.
15, 2005); United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov (last visited Aug.15, 2005); U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, http://fedcir.gov (last visited Aug. 15, 2005).
72 Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of Prece-
dent, 4 GREEN BAG 17, 18 (2000).
73 Id; see also Jerome I. Braun, Eighth Circuit Decision Intensifies Debate Over Publi-
cation and Citation of Appellate Opinions, 84 JUDICAruRE 90, 91 (2000) (stating that "the
word 'unpublished' has become purely a term of art, actually meaning 'non-precedential"');
K. K. DuVivier, Developments and Practice Notes, Are Some Words Better Left Unpub-
lished?: Precedent and the Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESs 397,
403 (2001).
74 Greenwald & Schwarz, Jr., supra note 1, at 1138 (classifying no-citation rules into




unpublished designation of the past: they restrict public accessibility. If a liti-
gant is unable to cite from an unpublished opinion, the judiciary may continue
to construct opinions of lesser quality, which are intended only for specific
litigants. However, these "lesser" opinions are attractive alternatives to judges
only if the opinions are powerless when applied to any other case. As a result,
concerns of judicial efficiency now outweigh75 concerns over the "ever increas-
ing practical difficulty and economic cost of establishing and maintaining ac-
cessible private and public law facilities" 76-the very fear that initially spurred
the implementation of publication plans."
C. THE NECESSITY OF PUBLICATION PLANS
Although the initial purpose behind publication plans was to save the cost
and time of librarian services due to prolific opinion writing,78 the court system
was aware of additional reasons to implement restrictions on publication.79
Nevertheless, non-publication plans single-handedly could not solve the crisis
and would require augmentation."0 No-citation rules were a logical choice.
To many, "[u]nlimited proliferation of published opinions" threatens a uni-
fied and consistent body of law;8' a legal system containing an incalculable
number of opinions would be nearly impossible to navigate and control. Addi-
tionally, with all these opinions abound, the burden of writing a judicial opin-
ion increases daily. 2 Limited publication greatly reduces the amount of time
75 Id. at 1145. Prior to the 1970s, the rationale for limited publication was the fear that
judges would be unable "to stay current with the development of the law." Id. This fear has
been replaced with another concern, deeply as frightening: the ability of judges to stay "cur-
rent with their own personal caseloads." Id.
76 1964 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 11.
77 Shuldberg, supra note 65, at 544.
The digital availability of information directly impacts both what it means for an opin-
ion to be "unpublished" and the rationale supporting the content of existing limited
publication plans. When the printed volume was the sole source of law, the decision
not to publish an opinion meant that the public did not have access to that opinion.
Now, however, opinions that are not published in print are nevertheless made available
to the public in digital format. Moreover, digital technology allows for more efficient
storage and research of information, which impacts the rationale underlying the limited
publication plans.
Id.
78 STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 19, at 8 ("Posting, maintenance, shelving
and librarian services result in time and money costs disproportionate to the value of the
materials.").
79 Id. at 6-8 (listing the need for cohesive law, the workload of lawyers, research de-
vices, and collegiality amongst judges as other reasons behind publication plans).
80 Id. at 6.
81 Id. (referencing an estimate in 1963 that claimed published opinions "approached two




and resources a judge must devote to the preparation of an opinion." Not only
does the ability to write an unpublished opinion streamline opinion writing
(since judges would not have to acquit their "legal scholarship in every opin-
ion"), but limited publication also avoids a disharmonious union among circuit
judges.84 Therefore, the judiciary will have more time to consider and resolve
critical issues through the disposition of cases with unpublished opinions."
These benefits, however, are not limited to the judiciary. If all opinions were
to be published and deemed as precedent, litigants would be "staggered by the
research load."86 In terms of researching and preparing a case, the encumbrance
of innumerous judicial opinions to litigants is proportionate to that of judges.87
Zealous advocacy would force litigators to conduct infinite searches for cases
with parallel fact-pattems in order to serve their clients. Such searches would
require an "immense expenditure of time and funds" to comb through moun-
tains of opinions.8"
There are additional concerns with increasing the weight given to unpub-
lished opinions. For example, is every case truly worthy for publication or con-
sideration as precedent? Judges may find the cases poorly briefed or the record
insufficient on which to base an opinion. 9 Furthermore, if a court rejected a
litigant's argument, giving every case precedential value may prematurely
foreclose a legal analysis or theory.9" Unpublished opinions may also display a
"lack of awareness of the accepted published law, [which judges argue] . . . is
best attributed not to the deciding courts' schemes but to the failure of counsel
to bring it to the courts' attention." 9'
83 Id.
84 Id. at 7.
85 Id.
86 See DuVivier, supra note 73, at 414.
87 STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 19, at 7.
88 Id.
89 Letter from Alex Kozinski, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 6 (Jan. 16, 2004),
http://www.nonpublication.com/kozinskiletter.pdf [hereinafter Kozinski Letter].
90 Id. (expressing fear that issuance of a precedential opinion that rejects a certain line of
reasoning, merely because it was presented in a poor fashion, might be the death of an actu-
ally viable argument).
91 Weresh, supra note 38, at 184.
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D. STATUS QUO: CONFUSION
"By their number and variety they tend to weaken the authority of each
other, and to perplex the judgment. "'
The 1974 "experiment" with different publication plans did not result in uni-
formity among the circuits.93 Over the years, the circuits have created a cornu-
copia of local rules and procedures for the publication and citation of appellate
opinions.94 In 1995, however, the Judicial Conference's desire for uniform
practice and procedures reignited. Congress recommended that the Judicial
Conference's committees join forces in order to create "a uniform set of proce-
dures and mechanisms for access to circuit court opinions, guidelines for pub-
lication distribution, and clear standards for citation."95
Although there are varying standards for publication of judicial opinions
among the circuits, there remains a constant, underlying assumption: "[n]ot all
decisions by the courts of appeals warrant publication."96 The court rules for
each circuit generally lay out the criterion for publication of opinions.9" Never-
theless, each publication plan differs on the amount of guidance given regard-
ing the decision to publish. Some circuits, like the Third Circuit, leave enor-
mous discretion to the individual panel members: "[a]n opinion ... is desig-
nated as precedential and printed ... when it has precedential or institutional
value."98 Conversely, other circuits follow a more comprehensive scheme:
A published opinion will be filed when the decision (i) establishes a new, or changes an ex-
isting rule of law; (ii) involves an issue of continuing public interest; (iii) criticizes or ques-
tions an existing law; (iv) constitutes a significant and nonduplicative contribution to legal
literature (A) by a historical review of law, (B) by describing legislative history, or (C) by
resolving or creating a conflict in the law; (v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of
an order; or (vi) is pursuant to an order of remand from the Supreme Court and is not ren-
dered merely in ministerial obedience to specific directions of that Court. 99
92 J. Myron Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate
Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REv. 791, 791 (1975) (internal citations omitted).
93 See discussion supra Part II.A.
94 COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 13, at 7.
95 JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
69-70 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CVRPGTOC.HTM.
96 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (commenting that the "over-
whelming consensus" of judicial and academic opinion is that the issuance of non-
precedential opinions does not violate the Constitution as a matter of policy); Robel, supra
note 38, at 941 (recommending that "opinions that serve no lawmaking function should not
be published").
97 Gerken, supra note 70, at 480.
98 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 5.2.
99 7TH CI. R. 53(c)(1).
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The publication plans of the circuits diverge in other areas as well. Plans dif-
fer as to presumptions of publication"° as well as the number of judicial votes
required to categorize an opinion as published or unpublished.'' Unfortunately,
many believe that judges ignore their own circuit's standards when making
these decisions.0 2 These disjointed approaches to unpublished opinions create
a confusion that naturally spills over into attempts to cite to these opinions.
The American College of Trial Lawyers finds the current circuit rules re-
garding publication and citation to be "confusing, perilous, and getting
worse."'' 3 Today, three systems exist in the courts of appeals concerning cita-
tion to unpublished opinions: prohibited, disfavored, and permitted.
Four circuits-the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits-currently
employ a prohibitory system. These circuits prohibit citation to unpublished
opinions, except in related cases for the purposes of res judicata, collateral es-
toppel, and law of the case."'
The second group of circuits maintains a scheme of disapproval. The First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits disfavor but allow citation to
an unpublished opinion when the unpublished opinion has "precedential" or
"persuasive" value on a material issue, and there is no published opinion that is
on point.0 5 It is unclear what these circuits mean by "precedential" value since
an opinion is designated as unpublished once it has been determined that it
does not establish, alter, modify, clarify, or explain a rule of law.0 6
The third and final category-aptly named the permissive circuits-includes
the Third and Eleventh, and the District of Columbia ("D.C.") Circuit opinions
'00 See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 36.2(b)(1) ("In general, the court thinks it desirable that opinions
be published."); see also DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UNPUBLISHED DisPosI-
TIONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 29-30 (1985).
'0' STIENSTRA, supra note 100, at 32; see, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 36; 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERAT-
INGP. 5.1; 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.2; 11 TH CIR. R. 36-2.
102 COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 13, at 6.
103 Id. at 2.
104 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 7T CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b).
Any opinions published in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
prior to January 1, 2001, are also prohibited from being cited. D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(A).
105 1ST CIR. R. 32.3(a)(2); 4TH CIR. R. 36(c); 5TH CIR. LOC. R. 47.5.3; 6TH CIR. R. 28(g);
8TH CIR. R. 28(i); IOTH CIR. R. 36.3.
106 See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(a) which provides:
Opinions by the Court will be published only if the opinion satisfies one or more of the
standards for publication:
i. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within the circuit; or
ii. It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
iii. It criticizes existing law; or
iv. It contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative; or
v. It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or creates a conflict with a deci-
sion in another circuit.
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issued on or after January 1, 2002. These circuits do not impose restrictions on
the reasons for which a litigant can cite an unpublished opinion."7 The value
these circuits will give these opinions remains unclear. The Third Circuit does
not specify how much weight an unpublished opinion should be given,' ° while
the Eleventh Circuit considers them to be of persuasive value."9 The D.C. Cir-
cuit allows citation of unpublished opinions distributed after January 1, 2002 to
be cited as precedent;". however, litigants are reminded that the circuit decides
to issue an unpublished opinion when "it sees no precedential value in that dis-
position.""' These various no-citation practices and publication plans are at
odds, and the confusion they engender raises numerous concerns within the
legal community."' Yet, the heart of the debate always comes back to a single
uncertainty: the value of an unpublished opinion as precedent."3
E. I'M A PARTY AND I'LL CITE IF I WANT TO... BUT SHOULD I
HAVE THE RIGHT TO?
In order to safeguard the efficiency associated with non-publication, litigants
must be persuaded not to use unpublished opinions. Two primary disincentives
are widely in practice in the courts of appeals: no-citation rules and uselessness
as precedent. Academics have been the strongest opponents of publication
plans and no-citation rules."4 They have attacked both disincentives on public
107 3D CIR. R. 28.3; 11TH CIR. R. 36-2; D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B).
08 See 3D CIR. R. 28.3 (failing to list unpublished opinions among the authority consid-
ered binding on the court); 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 5.8 (stating that the court cannot
refer to an unpublished opinion because such opinions are not binding).
109 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.
0D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B).
D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2); see also D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES § IX.A.7 ("[C]ounsel will now be permitted to argue that an unpublished dis-
position is binding precedent on a particular issue .... [But] counsel are reminded that the
Court's decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the Court sees no preceden-
tial value in that disposition.").
112 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 130 (1990) (claiming the "pol-
icy in courts of appeals of not publishing certain opinions, and concomitantly restricting
their citation . . . [due to] perceived necessity" is now obsolete due to technological ad-
vances).
"M See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as
moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that every written
opinion in the circuit will be precedent). Contra Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that Article III of the Constitution does not require federal courts to treat all
of their decisions as binding precedent).
114 See Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules,
3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 295 (2001); 2004 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 9
("[M]any bar associations, attorneys, and members of the public, and numerous law review
and bar journal articles have been urging for a long time a review of the disparate citation
practices"); Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 11-12 (stating that no-citation rules "enjoy
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policy and constitutionality grounds." 5
i. Public Policy
The central policy issue in the debate over publication and no-citation doc-
trines revolves around the issue of fairness." 6 Not long ago, when unpublished
opinions were only found physically on file with the court, it was thought that
without no-citation rules, "large institutional litigants [like the government]
who can afford to collect and organize non-precedential opinions would have
an unfair advantage."1 7 Nevertheless, technology and the resulting accessibil-
ity have made this argument moot."8 Therefore, the debate turns to the contin-
ued practice of restricting citation to these physically accessible yet unpub-
lished opinions.
Definite assumptions in this dispute are logical: (1) there is no incentive for
citation without the benefit of precedence; (2) for an opinion to have preceden-
tial value, it must have some power to bind; and (3) the power to legally bind
future litigants and courts obliges authors to bind themselves to their written
word and requires future litigants to find that written word. These obligations,
namely careful opinion writing and research, increase the burdens associated
with litigation for both courts and litigants alike. These burdens stretch re-
sources and time, thereby increasing delays in adjudication"9 and creating a
"less accessible class of precedents.
' "20
The inverse of these assumptions is also true: restrictions on citation limits
precedence.12' This restriction of precedence ensures that a smaller library of
legal opinions exists. Fewer legal opinions promote equal access to prece-
dent. 22 While a cursory glance at the methods of research may illustrate that
public accessibility to unpublished opinions is limitless and generally free of
widespread support among members of the bar because many lawyers recognize significant
benefits to them and their clients, though the critics of no-citation rules tend to be very vo-
cal, thus creating the illusion that theirs is the prevailing view").
115 Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 114, at 296. See generally Babcock, supra note 24, at
33; Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does
the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995); Snowden, supra note 24, at 1253; Strongman, supra
note 24; Tusk, supra note 3.
116 STIENSTRA,supra note 100, at 3.
"17 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 107TH CONG., MINUTES OF
FAIL 2002 MEETING 27 (2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP 12-2002.pdf.
118 See discussion supra Part II.B.
119 See discussion infra Part IV.A.iii.
120 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 14.
121 Daniel B. Levin, Fairness and Precedent, 110 YALE L.J. 1295, 1301 (2001).
122 Id; see also Robel, supra note 38, at 946 (claiming that "[d]ifferential access to the
opinions favors certain litigants," namely the wealthy and frequent litigators).
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cost, a more thorough look reveals that this access is not free from encum-
brances. For a fee a litigant may conduct computer research on Lexis or West-
law or perform, free of charge, case research on the websites created by the
courts themselves. However, these "free" websites are not always free from
impediments or costs. For example, a litigant must have access to a computer,
must pay Internet service provider fees, and must masterfully navigate these
websites'23 in order to avoid expending additional time and possibly incurring
additional costs. Endless research may be fueled by the idea that a relevant and
material unpublished opinion exists: an idea that can be equated with the "pro-
verbial needle in the haystack."' 24 Even so, only litigants with vast resources
could locate such a needle if it were to exist.'25 The fear is that litigants with
vast resources will be able to create their own pool of precedents if unpub-
lished opinions are citable. Thus, the exact argument that proponents of FRAP
32.1 have used in the past turns against them. If fairness is to be a central fight-
ing point, then it is "unfair to allow counsel, or others having special knowl-
edge of an unpublished opinion, to use it if favorable and withhold it if unfa-
vorable.
126
Allegations can also surface that publication plans and no-citation rules
make it harder for the public to hold judges accountable for their decisions.
Yet, trial courts at the state' 27 and federal level function without a mandatory
opinion-writing and publication requirement'28 and are never questioned about
their behavior over these practices.'29
123 A visit to the websites maintained by the federal courts of appeals (where court opin-
ions-published and unpublished-are posted as required by the E-Government Act of
2002) exposes a very confusing and not easily navigable system. The easiest way to retrieve
an opinion is through its docket number-an often impossible piece of information to know
unless one was a party to the litigation. Although keyword search features exist, they are
nowhere near as detailed or sophisticated as Lexis or Westlaw features; there are no summa-
ries, headnotes or points of law. A litigant would have to read hundreds of cases before
coming across binding precedent. Furthermore, some circuits post opinions going back only
a few years. See text accompanying supra note 71.
124 Levin, supra note 121, at 1301-02.
125 Id.
126 STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 19, at 19.
127 Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Citability and the Nature of Precedent in the Courts of Appeals: A
Response to Dean Robel, 35 IND. L. REv. 423, 433 (2002) (finding state appellate unpub-
lished opinions less accessible and citable then their federal counterpart since only five
states permit citation).
128 J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 22,
45 (5th ed. 1990).
129 It is important to note that many lower trial courts are not courts of record. US-
Info.state.gov, Outline of the U.S. Legal System, Dec. 2004,




The text of the Constitution is the logical launching point for any examina-
tion of the legality of these doctrines. In Article III, the Founders declared that
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court .... [And it] shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treatises made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority .. .... Nowhere do the Founders provide
guidance on the role of precedent.
1. Ultra Vires Actions?
"I am not so naYve (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that
judges in a real sense 'make' law. ,131
At least one circuit has held that all unpublished opinions hold precedential
value and, therefore, restricting citation to them is outside the scope of Article
III powers granted to the federal judiciary.'32 In 2000, the Eighth Circuit al-
leged that any restriction on precedence would be "an approach to tyranny and
arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of
all the just checks upon judicial authority.' ' 3  The Eighth Circuit judiciary be-
lieved this ruling was in harmony with the intent of our Founding Fathers.'
34
To the contrary, this "originalist view" is out of tune with the principles laid
out by the framers of the Constitution. The Continental Congress never de-
bated the doctrine of precedent13' and the Federalist Papers touched upon the
subject just briefly. 36 Additionally, it is the province of the Legislative Branch
to create parameters in which the Judicial Branch is to function: "The Constitu-
tion gives Congress authority to determine the size, jurisdiction, and structure
130 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2, cl. 1.
131 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
132 See generally Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as
moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Cooper, supra note
127, at 425 (stating that the Eighth Circuit primarily relied upon an originalist analysis of the
judicial power).
133 Id. at 900.
134 Id.
135 Cooper, supra note 127, at 425.
136 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). "To
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
particular case that comes before them." Id. at 470. See Cooper, supra note 127, at 425 n. 16
(arguing that this statement was not part of a comprehensive depiction of the features of
judicial power, but rather part of an argument promoting life tenure for judges).
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of the judicial branch, the level at which it will be funded, and, within limits,
the basic procedural rules the courts apply."
37
Furthermore, it is an inherent responsibility of judges to manage precedent
and develop a consistent and reasoned body of law to govern litigation.'38 The
Supreme Court has twice passed on the opportunity to rule on the constitution-
ality of no-citation rules, which supports the view that courts have an innate
power to decide what opinions are of precedential value, as well as limit a liti-
gant's ability to cite from unpublished opinions.'39
2. To Cite or Not To Cite... That Is a First Amendment Question!
Reformers have argued that "no-citation" rules violate First Amendment
protections.4 This argument asserts that "these rules-which restrict attorneys
from communicating certain information (the content of an unpublished opin-
ion) in advance of the time that such communication is to occur (in a brief or
oral argument)--operate as an impermissible prior restraint on attorney
speech."''
Dissenters also note the ability of practitioners to cite "opinions of federal
district courts, state courts, and foreign jurisdictions, law review articles, trea-
tises, newspaper columns, Shakespearian sonnets, and advertising jingles,"
when forwarding their argument.'42 Yet, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals draws the obvious distinction: name-brand recognition. He
argues that one would never mistake the above-referenced list for "expressions
of the law of the circuit."'43 Although the Advisory Committee maintains that
citation to an unpublished opinion would merely be for the persuasiveness of
its reasoning,'44 Judge Kozinski claims that the litigators really want "the added
137 William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, in STATE OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES (Shelley L. Dowling ed.), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/an96ttb/lyearend.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2005).
138 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159-80 (9th Cir. 2001).
139 See Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S.
917 (1976); Bowder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of II1., 434 U.S. 257, 258 n.1 (1978).
140 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech."
141 Tusk, supra note 3, at 1202; see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
553 (1975) (defining a prior restraint as any scheme which gives "public officials the power
to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression").
142 Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Ap-
pellate Rules to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure 35 (May 22, 2003) [hereinafter May 22, 2003 Alito Memorandum],
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2003.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
143 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 2.
144 May 22, 2003 Alito Memorandum, supra note 142, at 35.
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boost of claiming that three court of appeals judges endorse that reasoning."'45
No-citation rules do not limit a litigator's use of the content of unpublished
opinions. On the contrary, they are free to rely on the arguments and thought
processes of unpublished opinions.'46 Instead, no-citation rules merely prohibit
litigators from citing to the case itself'47 Furthermore, the generalized prohibi-
tion against prior restraint is not absolute. In fact, the Supreme Court has sanc-
tioned its use in cases of "clear and present danger to national security" as well
as those involving obscenity." 8 Additionally, as an officer of the court, a law-
yer may be subject to restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would
not.'49 Moreover, the Court has held that "in the courtroom itself, during a judi-
cial proceeding, whatever right to 'free speech' an attorney has is extremely
circumscribed."' 50
Mere distrust of the judiciary causes these misplaced fears and, while fear of
judicial irresponsibility is a legitimate concern, it provides little justification
for mandating universal citation of unpublished opinions.' By adopting strict
publication guidelines, judges will be held accountable and fear of judicial im-
propriety will be mitigated.'52
III. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1
The controversy surrounding the use of unpublished opinions was brought
to the judicial forefront in 2000 and 2001 by two "intellectual heavy-
145 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 4.
146 "The non-citation rule does not preclude the use of reasoning and ideas taken from an
unpublished opinion that may happen to be in the possession of counsel." STANDARDS FOR
PUBLICATION, supra note 19, at 18-19.
147 Therefore, any arguments claiming no-citation rules are content-based restrictions on
speech are incorrect. See Greenwald & Schwarz, Jr., supra note 1, at 1164.
148 Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 62-65 (1976) (listing various instances where speech has been restricted).
149 See generally In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
150 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991).
151 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 168-69
(1996).
Given the workload of the federal courts of appeals today, the realistic choice is not be-
tween limited publication, on the one hand, and, on the other, improving and then pub-
lishing all the opinions that are not published today; it is between preparing but not
publishing opinions in many cases and preparing no opinions in those cases. It is a
choice, in other words, between giving the parties reasons for the decision of their ap-
peal and not giving them reasons even though the appeal is not frivolous.
Id.
152 Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Making
the Decision to Publish, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 331 (2001) (maintaining that for-
mal publication guidelines and internal enforcement of them by peer oversight, keeps judges
honest in their publication decisions).
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weights":'53 Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit in the Anastasoff v. United
States opinion'54 and Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit in the Hart v. Massa-
nari opinion.'55 Unfortunately, these fascinating arguments focused largely on
the circumscribed question as to whether unpublished decisions should be
given the same binding precedential value as published opinions from the same
jurisdiction.'56
By 2001, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") joined the debate. The DOJ
asked the Judicial Conference to amend the rules and establish uniform proce-
dures permitting the citation of unpublished opinions.'57 In response, the Con-
ference began an arduous rulemaking process that same year.'58 This was not
153 Barnett, supra note 69, at 8.
'14 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000). Faye Anastasoff sought a
refund for overpaid federal income tax. Id. at 899. She mailed her refund claim to the IRS
on April 13, 1996 for taxes she paid on April 15, 1993. Id. The IRS denied her claim under
26 U.S.C. § 6511(b), which limited the payment of refunds to taxes paid within the three
years prior to the filing of the claim. Id. Although the appellant had mailed her claim within
this period, the IRS did not receive and file it until April 16, 1996, which made her claim
one day late. Id. Under the "mailbox rule," which deems claims as received when post-
marked, the appellant's claim would have been valid. Id. However, in a prior unpublished
opinion, the Eighth Circuit ruled that reliance on the "mailbox rule" is improper under a §
6511(b) claim. See generally Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 36446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992). The appellant argued that the Circuit was not bound
by the Christie decision because it was an unpublished opinion and thus not precedent under
8th Cir. R. 28A(i). Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
"I Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). A lawyer in an appellate brief cited
an unpublished opinion. Id. at 1158-59. The Court ordered counsel to show cause as to why
he should not be disciplined for violating 9th Cir. R. 36-3 which states that "[u]npublished
dispositions and orders of this Court are not binding precedent ... [and generally] may not
be cited to or by the courts of this circuit .... Id. at 1159; 9TH CIR. R. 36-3. Counsel re-
sponded that Rule 36-3 is possibly unconstitutional, relying on the Eighth Circuit's ruling in
Anastasoff. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159.
56 Velamoor, supra note 19, at 564; Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900-05; Hart, 266 F.3d at
1159-77.
'57 The DOJ has proposed that a new rule, Rule 32.1, be added to the FRAP governing
citation of unpublished or non-precedential opinions. Memorandum from Judge Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules to Judge Anthony J. Scirica,
Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3 (May 21, 2002),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2002.pdf [hereinafter May 21, 2002 Alito
Memorandum].
158 Under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress has authorized the federal judiciary to
promulgate the rules of practice, procedure and evidence for the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. §§
2071-2072 (2000). This authority is subject to Congressional scrutiny. Id. § 2074. The Act
authorized the creation of the Judicial Conference which, in turn, authorized the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure ("Standing Committee") and an advisory committee
specifically dealing with appellate rules. See id § 2073; Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, The Rulemaking Process,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2005) [hereinafter
The Rulemaking Process]. If the advisory committee recommends a rule change, it must
obtain the Standing Committee's approval to publish the rule for notice and comment. The
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the first attempt to create uniform citation procedures. 59 In April 1998, the Ad-
visory Committee unanimously declined to regulate citations of unpublished
opinions, reasoning that nearly every circuit court's chief judge opposed such
regulations. 6 ° Nevertheless, just three years later, the Advisory Committee
decided to reverse their stance amid accusations that revisiting the proposed
rule would be fruitless and disrespectful towards the circuits' chief judges. 6 '
A. A MODEST PROPOSAL
Despite the legal community's misguided perceptions, and in light of judi-
cial activism within the circuits,'62 the Advisory Committee passed a motion by
a six-to-three vote in the spring of 2002.163 The motion proffered to amend the
Appellate Rules to include a uniform standard of citation for unpublished opin-
ions. 6" After drafting three forms of Proposed Rule 32.1,165 the Committee fi-
nally agreed on a single version."6
Rulemaking Process, supra. There is usually a minimum of seven stages of comment and
review that can take up to three years to complete. Id. Once the public comment is complete,
if the advisory committee votes to proceed, the proposal is sent to the Standing Committee.
Id. The Standing Committee reviews the recommendations of the advisory committee and
recommends to the Judicial Conference any proposed rule changes it feels may "be neces-
sary to maintain consistency and otherwise promote the interests of justice." 28 U.S.C. §
2073(b). If accepted by the Judicial Conference, the rule must then be accepted by the Su-
preme Court and avoid any modification or rejection by Congress. The Rulemaking Process,
supra. Congress need not publicly approve the rule for it to take effect. Id.
159 The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules kept Item No. 91-17 on its study
agenda, which included, among other things, the question as to whether FRAP should regu-
late the citation of unpublished opinions, for seven years. ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE
RULES, 107TH CONG., MINUTES OF SPRING 2001 MEETING 64 (April 11, 2001),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0401 .pdf.
160 Id.
161 Id.; "Concerns about offending judges deeply opposed to the rule change remained
the primary argument against the amendment .... Velamoor, supra note 19, at 566.
162 ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, 107TH CONG., MINUTES OF SPRING 2002
MEETING 23-24 (April 22, 2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0402.pdf. The
committee specifically referenced the D.C. Circuit's recent rule change. Id. at 24. A survey
conducted by the advisory committee revealed that there was no longer uniformity amongst
the circuits regarding citation of unpublished opinions. Id. at 23.
163 Id. at 25.
164 Id.
165 Memorandum from Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, to Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair Advisory Committee on Appel-
late Rules (Dec. 6, 2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP 12-2002.pdf
166 Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair Advisory Committee on Appel-
late Rules Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 42-43 (May 14, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2004.pdf [hereinafter May 14, 2004 Alito




By its own admission, FRAP 32.1 is "extremely limited."'67 It gives no opin-
ion as to whether an unpublished opinion should be treated as precedent.68 It
also does not expressly grant power to the appellate courts to issue unpublished
opinions, nor does it prescribe to a court the circumstances that should desig-
nate an opinion "unpublished."'69 It merely addresses the citability of an unpub-
lished judicial opinion. 7°
The Rule unsuccessfully tries to distinguish citability from precedential
value. However, the Advisory Committee fails to recognize that "cases are
cited almost exclusively for their precedential power."'' Because all cases un-
der FRAP 32.1 will be citable, the Rule "is of necessity saying that all prior
decisions have some precedential effect.'
72
FRAP 32.1 is of little use to litigants and judges. Since the regulation does
not prescribe the level of precedential value that a court should give an unpub-
lished opinion, the focal point of contention is completely ignored. In short,
FRAP 32.1 is a regulatory wash.
Rule 32.1. Citation of Judicial Dispositions
(a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon the citation
of judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been
designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential," "not prece-
dent," or the like, unless that prohibition or restriction is generally imposed upon the ci-
tation of all judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions.
(b) Copies Required. A party who cites a judicial opinion, order, judgment, or other
written disposition that is not available in a publicly accessible electronic database
must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order, judgment, or other written disposition
with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.
Id.
167 Id. at 3.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 3-4.
171 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 4; see also Letter from the Judges of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Judge, Third Circuit Court of Appeals
(Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from the Seventh Circuit],
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-396.pdf.
Under the proposed rule, while a court will no longer be allowed to forbid the citation
of unpublished opinions, it will be allowed to deny precedential force to them, a com-
bination that puzzles us. If the opinions have no force as precedent, their citation value
is small. As a practical matter, we expect that they will be accorded significant prece-
dential effect, simply because the judges of a court will be naturally reluctant to repu-
diate or ignore previous decisions.
Id.
172 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 4 (emphasis in original); see also Letter from the
Seventh Circuit, supra note 171 ("If we did ignore them [cited unpublished opinions], it
would mean that the proposed rule had accomplished no purpose at all.").
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ii. Call-Waiting for Citation
Proposed Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure caused
quite a stir during its rollout. Referred to as "the most controversial issue in the
history of the judicial rule-making process,"'7 3 the New York Times'74 com-
mented about the Rule and entire websites are dedicated to its discussion. 75In
fact, nearly 500 submissions were received when the Rule was published for
comment in August 2003, in contrast to a mere twenty written comments sub-
mitted when other proposed amendments were published in August 2000.,76
Despite this intellectual reactivity, the Standing Rules Committee recommitted
the Rule for further study in June 2004.
During this period, federal appellate courts were vocal in claiming that the
Rule would foster an increase in workload and therefore an increase in "work
time" dedicated to case disposal.'77 The Committee decided to defer approving
the proposed rule in order to empirically study whether or not lifting the ban on
citation would further burden the courts in the nine circuits that currently per-
mit citation.'78
173 Tony Mauro, Unpublished Opinions: Inedible Sausage or Crazy Uncle, LAW.COM,
April 6, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1081348862446 (quoting Professor
Patrick Schiltz).
174 Adam Liptak, Federal Appeals Court Decisions May Go Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
25, 2002, at A21.
175 See, e.g., NonPublication.com, http://www.nonpublication.com (last visited Aug. 17,
2005); The Rule of Law, http://www.rule-of-law.info (last visited Aug. 17, 2005); Secret
Justice, http://www.secretjustice.org (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
176 May 14, 2004 Alito Memorandum, supra note 164, at 1-2.
177 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 11.
Many of the [no-citation] rule changes have been recent, and most impose some limita-
tions-such as the requirement that there be no published authority directly on point.
Moreover, [it is] much too early to tell the effects of these changes; certainly no com-
prehensive study has been done. We do not know that some circuits have resorted to
frequent use of judgment orders, which eliminates the problem, but also gives parties
far less information than we do in our unpublished dispositions.
Id.
178 2004 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 7-13.
Several courts of appeals have expressed concerns with some aspects of the proposed
rule. Theses concerns are mainly centered on the belief that permitting citation of non-
precedential opinions will significantly increase the workload of the courts. In response
to that increase, these courts predict that time to disposition will increase as will the
number of summary judgment orders. These concerns can be tested empirically in the
nine circuits that now permit citation. In an effort to reach a greater consensus among
the courts, and in deference to the circuits that oppose the proposed rule, the Commit-
tee decided to defer approving the proposed new rule in favor of such an empirical
study. The Committee concluded that some further consideration by the advisory
committee would be helpful once the empirical study was completed. The further con-
sideration would take into account the results of the empirical study but need not be
limited to empirical issues. The Committee was particularly interested in the advisory
committee's further consideration of the application of the proposed rule to state court
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iii. A Surprising Study
The Federal Judicial Center released the results of its study regarding cita-
tion to unpublished opinions in the federal courts of appeals in the early
months of 2005.' The study's findings prematurely purported a dearth of evi-
dence of harmful consequences that opponents of 32.1 claim the adoption of
the Rule will bring.8 ° Such findings were the basis for the Committee's April
18, 2005 approval of the proposed rule,' 8' which eventually brought a subse-
quent nod from the Judicial Conference. 8 2 In its present form, the rule would
be prospective-applying only to decisions issued by the courts on or after
January 1, 2007.183 However, before 32.1 takes effect, it not only needs the
proverbial seal of approval from the Supreme Court, but must also survive in-
spection by Congress. 84
However, the main crux of the citation-publication argument regarding the
precedential value of such opinions is being ignored. In addition, the Federal
Judicial Center's conclusory statements supporting the Committee's decision
are a statistician's nightmare.185 Requiring the entire federal appellate court
unpublished decisions. The Committee was careful to state that the action was neutral
and should not be understood to express disapproval of the proposal.
Id. at 13. Approval by the Committee at this stage does not guarantee that the Rule will be
implemented; it still must be approved by the Supreme Court. See supra note 158 and ac-
companying text.
179 TIM REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (2005),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Citatio2.pdf/$File/Citatio2.pdf [hereinafter FED.
JUDICIAL CTR. STUDY] (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
180 Memorandum from to Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure 5 (May 6, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2005.pdf [here-
inafter May 6, 2005 Alito Memorandum]; see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR. STUDY, supra note
179, at 3-4 (claiming that in courts that permit citation, the length of unpublished opinions
and the time spent preparing them would not change if attorneys were prohibited from citing
unpublished opinions).
181 Id. at 1, 8-13.
182 News Release, Judicial Conference of the United States, Conference Memorializes




185 The Federal Judicial Center's self-described empirical study and methodology ap-
pears as follows:
At its June 2004 meeting, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
asked the Appellate Rules Advisory Committee to ask the Federal Judicial Center to
conduct empirical research that would yield results helpful to the Standing Commit-
tee's consideration of the Appellate Rules Advisory Committee's proposed rule. We
undertook a research effort with three components: (1) a survey ofjudges, (2) a survey
of attorneys, and (3) a survey of case files.
We surveyed all 257 sitting circuit judges and asked how citation rules are likely to af-
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system to abide by a rule based on answers of fourjudges is problematic.'86
fect the time it takes to prepare unpublished opinions, the length of unpublished opin-
ions, and the frequency of unpublished opinions. We also asked judges in circuits
whose courts permit citation to unpublished opinions in unrelated cases-the discour-
aging circuits and the permissive circuits-whether these citations require additional
work, are helpful, and are inconsistent with published authority. We asked judges in re-
strictive circuits whether special characteristics of their circuits would create problems
if attorneys were permitted to cite unpublished opinions in related cases. The courts of
appeals in both the First and the District of Columbia Circuits changed their local rules
recently to relax restrictions on citations to unpublished opinions.
To get a representative sample of appellate attorneys who practice in each circuit, we
selected the authors of briefs filed in a random sample of appeals in each circuit where
a counseled brief was filed on both sides-cases we call fully briefed appeals. We
asked attorneys about their desires to cite unpublished opinions in the cases selected,
and we asked them about the probable impact of a rule permitting citation to unpub-
lished opinions.
We examined a random sample of cases filed in each circuit to determine how often
attorneys and courts cite unpublished opinions in unrelated cases. We have also col-
lected data on whether the cases are resolved by published or unpublished opinions, or
without opinions, and how long the published and unpublished opinions are.
FED. JUDICIAL CTR. STUDY, supra note 179, at 1. Although 257 sitting circuit judges were
surveyed, only 222 responded; ten of the responding judges did not answer any of the ques-
tions. Id. at 3. Most disturbing about the survey was its failure to address the effect of judges
who opted out of answering certain questions. See, e.g., id. at 5 ("We received answers to
these questions from 72% of the judges asked."); id. at 10 ("We received answers to this
question from 75% of the judges asked."); id. at 12 ("We received answers to this question
from 36% of the judges in the District of Columbia Circuit."). No reference was made re-
garding subsequent attempts to retrieve answers from judges that did not respond, nor was
any reference made as to how, if at all, certain judges chose to self-select out of the survey
or certain questions could skew the results.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines empirical in the context of a practice or work
habit as something "guided by mere experience, without scientific knowledge." THE OX-
FORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 188 (2d ed. 1989). Many of the questions asked in the study did
not relate to experience, rather, they asked for pure conjecture. See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.
STUDY, supra note 179, at 6 ("If no restrictions were placed on the ability of an attorney to
cite an unpublished opinion of your court for its persuasive value, do you think that the
number of unpublished opinions that you author would increase, decrease, or stay the same?
If there would be an increase or decrease, which best describes the degree of change?
Choices were very great, great, moderate, small, and very small."); id. at 8 ("If attorneys in
your circuit were allowed to cite unpublished opinions in your court for its persuasive
value, would the amount of time spent in your chambers in preparing unpublished opinions
increase, decrease, or stay the same?"); id. at 9 ("Would a rule allowing citation of unpub-
lished opinions in your circuit cause problems because of any special characteristics of your
court or its practices?"); id at 17 ("What effect on your appellate work would a new rule of
appellate procedure freely permitting citations to unpublished opinions in all circuits (but
not changing whether such opinions are binding precedent or not) have on your federal ap-
pellate work?"); id. at 18 ("The Appellate Rules Advisory Committee has proposed a new
national rule, which would permit citation to the courts of appeals' unpublished opinions;
what impact would you expect such a rule to have?").
186 FED. JUDICIAL CTR. STUDY, supra note 179, at 12 ("We received answers to these
questions from 36% of the judges in the District of Columbia Circuit. All four judges said
that the amount of time they spend drafting unpublished opinions has not changed since the
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IV. IS UNIFORMITY THE SOLUTION?
"A Court is not bound to give the like judgment, which had been given by a
former Court, unless they are of the opinion that the firstjudgment was
according to law; for any Court may err; and if a Judge conceives, that a
judgment given by a former Court is erroneous, he ought not in conscience to
give the likejudgment, he being sworn to judge according to the law. "87
FRAP 32.1 merely focuses on a uniform solution to the citability of unpub-
lished opinions, yet remains silent as to their uses as precedent. The Committee
has left this decision to the individual circuits. This thought process colors over
the true conundrum and heart of the 32.1 debate: precedential power. 8 The
idea of two separate categories of opinions, precedential and non-precedential,
is useful and utilitarian and worth retaining. Indeed, the call for a uniform pub-
lication plan from so many years earlier is a call that now all should heed.
A. THE ADDAGE "DO AS I SA YAND NOTAS I DO'" DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION
From the first day of law school, students are inculcated into the mystique of the common
law. Law has developed for centuries, incrementally, from case to case. Principles first
enunciated in "landmark" cases are elaborated, over time, in subsequent cases, which apply
those principles to a range of factual and procedural contexts. In this way, the law develops
organically, collaboratively, as a logical and necessary consequence of the adjudication of
real-life legal contests. Or so we thought ....
i. The True Role of Precedent in Our Judicial System
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. ,190
Stare decisis, "the doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
litigation," 9 ' is not constitutionally prescribed but rather an outgrowth of "wise
judicial practice, procedure, and policy."'92 Courts follow this doctrine because
it fosters "reliance, predictability, [and] stability" in our judicial system while
opinions became citable.").
187 Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 175, 178 (Pa. 1786).
188 DuVivier, supra note 73, at 410.
189 Gerken, supra note 70, at 475.
190 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1896).
191 BLACK'S, supra note 2, at 1414.
192 Paulsen, supra note 8, at 1538.
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simultaneously restraining the discretionary power of the judiciary.'93 Further-
more, adherence to precedent "expedites the work of the court by preventing
the constant reconsideration of settled questions[;]"' 9 4 the court need not rein-
vent the wheel every time.
Dissenters of publication and no-citation plans incorrectly believe that the
Constitution mandates all opinions to be published and viewed as precedent.'95
The Constitution neither promotes nor prohibits reliance on legal precedent.
Nevertheless, reformers have dissected the raw language of the Constitution in
attempts to massage constitutional violations into existence. Additionally, the
treatment of unpublished opinions as precedent does not promote predictability
and stability of the law for which the doctrine of stare decisis calls. "Rather,
unpredictability and instability would seem to follow."'96 To allow the use of
precedent to which an average person would have difficulty accessing would
make the law "capricious and unpredictable."'0 7
ii. The Rise of an Official Publisher
From its inception, the American common law system has never mandated
the publication of every appellate decision. 9 In fact, the First Congress laid
the groundwork for the entire federal judiciary without providing for an official
reporter for the highest court of the land.'99 The Justices agreed informally
amongst themselves that a reporter was necessary to memorialize their deci-
sions."' Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court recorded less than 50% of its de-
cisions in the first ten years."' Yet, this number is exceedingly high when jux-
taposed with the fact that the Court reduced very few of its oral opinions to
193 Id. at 1540.
194 Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV.
409,410 (1924).
195 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000) citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (explaining that "inherent in every judicial
decision" is a declaration or interpretation of a principle of law and therefore it is prece-
dent).
196 Yellow Book of N.Y. v. Dimilia, 729 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (2001).
197 Id.
198 Weresh, supra note 38, at 186.
199 Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on
Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1985).
200 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 614-15 (1834) (assertion of counsel that the
Justices "invited [a Reporter] to attend [hearings] at his own expense and report the cases;
and there was at least a tacit engagement on their part to furnish him with such notes or
written opinions as they might draw up").
201 J. GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 662, 799 (arguing that the
figure "probably exceeds 70 percent" when the inquiry focuses on cases adjudicated on the
merits or jurisdictional grounds).
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written opinions. 2°2 Furthermore, Reporters used their own discretion in select-
ing opinions for publication. It appears that the Reporters alone decided which
opinions were to receive binding precedence on subsequent cases.2 °3
The idea of officially recording judicial opinions in written form was foreign
and slow to ignite among the burgeoning states.2 °4 It was not until 1817 that an
Act of Congress established an official Reporter for the United States Supreme
Court.0 5 Upon its creation, the common association of published judicial opin-
ions with the notion of public accessibility through a court reporter was estab-
lished." 6
iii. The Bloat of the Federal Appellate Docket and Its Effect on the Opinion
Writing Process
Adjudication at the court of appeals level ideally consists of seven phases.
Often referred to as the "Learned Hand Tradition "207 each of the three judges
on the appellate panel are required to participate in: (1) reviewing party briefs;
(2) attending oral argument; (3) participating in judicial conference; (4) memo-
rializing their personal assessment of the case, with such memorandum being
circulated simultaneously with the argument and conference; (5) drafting opin-
ion(s); (6) circulating opinion(s) for comment; and (7) finalizing the opinion
for subsequent publication. 8 In the case of a controversial or contested claim,
the drafted opinions may be circulated to the entire judiciary of that circuit for
202 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iv-v (1804). It was not until 1834 that the Court ordered the filing
of written opinions with the Clerk. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) vii (1834).
203 "The same discretion has been exercised in omitting to report cases turning on mere
questions of fact, and from which no important principle, or general rule, could be extracted
.... [They are, therefore,] inapplicable, as precedents, to future cases." 25 U.S. (I Wheat.)
iii-iv (1827); see also Joyce, supra note 199, at 1329 (claiming that this practice was con-
tinued "in later volumes, with almost no criticism").
204 Joyce, supra note 199, at 1342-43 ("By 1814, there was precedent for the official
appointment of a salaried reporter to the highest court of the state not only in Massachusetts
(1803), but also in New York (1804), New Jersey (1806) and apparently Kentucky (1804) as
well.").
205 Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 63, § 1, 3 Stat. 376.
206 "Writing, not custom, was thus the best guardian of the common law." Denis P. Duf-
fey, Jr., Symposium, Genre and Authority: The Rise of Case Reporting in the Early United
States, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 263,272 (1998).
207 Howard T. Markey, On the Present Deterioration of the Federal Appellate Process:
Never Another Learned Hand, 33 S.D. L. REv. 371, 380 (1988) (reminiscing about a time
when a judge could, as his predecessor Learned Hand did, talk in-depth about a case, "with
his feet on the desk and hands behind his head .... [and] having reached his decision, ..
write the entire opinion in longhand.").
208 Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the




This ideal process of appellate review is "a rare pleasure indeed."2 The re-
ality of this procedure includes a heavy reliance on law clerks and staff attor-
neys,"' a dramatic decline in oral argument,2 2 and an increased use of unpub-
lished opinions. 3
Courts universally hold that a reported decision, prepared by a panel of ap-
pellate judges, may be overturned by a ruling en banc-a proceeding where,
"all of the active judges in the court participate."2 4 En banc reviews, however,
are rare. Consequently, restricting a panel from issuing an unpublished opinion
gives the impression that the panel's opinion "represent[s] the entire court in
the case at hand."2 ' This restriction further "commands the allegiance of all
future panels in the consideration of subsequent cases" even though they had
no direct participation. 16
It is vital for federal courts to rely upon limited publication in order to keep
the wheels of justice turning. The "press of unmeritorious appeals" forces
judges "to ration their talents and to rely unduly on their law clerks."2 7 The
astronomical influx of habitual appeals also forces the bench to seek routine
methods to dispose easily of these cases." 8
209 Id. at 691 (indicating that this usually happens when there is a possible "redirection of
circuit precedent").
210 Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal
Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1485, 1491 (1995) (reviewing
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS (1994)).
211 Cooper & Berman, supra note 208, at 697-99.
212 Id. at 700 (claiming that sixty percent of all appeals are decided by the judges "after
reading the parties' briefs but without hearing argument").
213 Id. at 703.
This treatment arises out of the courts' rationale for the unpublished opinions: the no-
tion that, where a case is easily resolved on the basis of existing law, there is no need
for the court to take the time to write a polished, published opinion because the case
adds nothing new to the body of law, and there is no need for anyone to cite the court's
decision because other precedent exists to establish the pertinent point.
Id .
214 Id. at 721.
215 Id at 722.
216 Id.
217 Jones, supra note 210, at 1493.
218 Id.
Terse orders and memoranda may be the only possible judicial response to a large
number of cases in an overcrowded system, but we must be careful that our decisions
do not deteriorate into standardized forms. If a choice must be made, I personally
would prefer expanding the judge's in-chambers staff, because it is far more account-
able to the judge, or relying more on brief memorandum opinions so long as they are
still authored by judges.
Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality
Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REv. 766, 779 (1983).
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The precedential effect afforded opinions "turns on the exposition of the
relevant facts (and the omission of irrelevant ones), the precise phrasing of
propositions of law."2 9 Therefore, judges give much time, thought, and consid-
eration to every word22 and must be conscious of how their language may be
construed or misconstrued. They must act like seers and anticipate how their
language might be interpreted by future litigants and courts "and how small
variations in wording might be imbued with meanings never intended." '22 This
process takes up immense amounts of judicial time and therefore, given the
staggering caseload, is reserved only for opinions designated as published.2
B. THE NEED TO BALANCE JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AGAINST
FAIRNESS TO THE LITIGANTS
"[Wie can and must limit advocacy in order to ensure the fair
administration ofjustice-allowing each side to have its say without undue
expense, delay or distraction. -223
To say that an assault on judicial efficiency is insufficient to support publi-
cation plans and no-citation rules is naive. Numerous trial procedural rules list
judicial efficiency as a goal of the courts.2 In fact, Congress mandates effi-
ciency in the court system . 5 Additionally, there is a "practical limit on law-
219 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 5.
220 STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 19, at 3 ("[T]he judicial time and effort
essential for the development of an opinion to be published for posterity and widely distrib-
uted is necessarily greater than that sufficient to enable the judge to provide a statement so
that the parties can understand the reasons for the decision.").
221 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 5.
222 Id.
While an unpublished disposition can often be prepared in only a few hours, an opinion
generally takes many days (often weeks, sometimes months) of drafting, editing, pol-
ishing and revising. Frequently, this process brings to light new issues, calling for fur-
ther research, which may sometimes send the author all the way back to square one. In
short, writing an opinion is a tough, delicate, exacting, time-consuming process. Circuit
judges devote something like half their time, and half the time of their clerks, to cases
in which they write opinions, dissents, or concurrences.
Kozinski, supra note 38, at 39.
223 Id. at 20.
224 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the rules are to be "construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"); FED. R. EVID.
102 (stating that the rules should be construed to eliminate "unjustifiable expense and de-
lay"); FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (stating that the rules are to be interpreted to "eliminate unjustifi-
able expense and delay").
225 See generally Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471 et seq. (2000). This
statute required all 94 federal district courts to implement "civil justice expense and delay
reduction plan[s] ... [that would] facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the mer-
its, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inex-
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yers' and judges' ability to obtain and assimilate judicial opinions." 26 A reduc-
tion in precedent brings the enhanced efficiency that flows from a reduced
number of cases to sift through, and improves the quality of the limited number
of published opinions.
Proponents of FRAP 32.1 do not realize that the abandonment of no-citation
rules will "cripple our court system. '27 They seem to forget that every litigant
has the right to an appeal;22 the Federal Courts of Appeals are not certiorari
courts like the Supreme Court. Couple this with the staggering statistic that
there has been a "seventeen-fold increase in appeals since 1950 while the
number of federal appellate judges has not even tripled,"229 and one begins to
see how it is true that the judges are "being eaten alive."23 Abandonment by
the circuits of the practice of unpublished opinions or no-citation rules would
leave parties with one of two options: summary dispositions or backlogged
court systems. 3
i. Summary Dispositions
To be sure, not all district court proceedings are decided incorrectly or merit
a lengthy legal dissertation. In fact, numerous jurisdictions still allow appellate
panels to resolve cases (without an opinion) with one word: "affirmed" or "re-
versed." Reformers should take caution. An attack on no-citation rules and
unpublished opinions will likely force judges to rely more heavily on the brev-
ity and ease of a summary disposition to counter caseload pressure.
Precedence of a case is "dependent on the manner of transmission. '22 The
ability to recite a case holding does not sway a tribunal; "rather, the facts and
reasoning of a case are vital to the use of that case" for subsequent parties and
future conflicts.233 At a minimum, unpublished decisions give a skeletal presen-
tation of the case facts and the court's reasoning. These opinions naturally pro-
vide some protection against the nonpublication of clearly precedential deci-
sions,"' which would not be the case in summary dispositions.
pensive resolutions of civil disputes." Id. § 471.
226 Tusk, supra note 3, at 1208 (internal citation omitted).
227 DuVivier, supra note 73, at 397.
228 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
229 Jones, supra note 210, at 1486.
230 Id. at 1491 (quoting Thomas Gibbs Gee, former chief judge of the Fifth Circuit).
231 The author intentionally omits arguments calling for an increase in judgeships or
decrease in federal jurisdiction, leaving those articles for another ambitious student of law.
232 Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of






"If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment:
Though shall not ration justice. "235
Reformers call for a return to the Learned Hand traditional appellate re-
view.236 The fact is Judge Hand never wrote more than sixty opinions per
year.237 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit's per-judge case filings increased from a
mere 57 per judge in 1960 to a whopping 220 in 1990.238
Unsurprisingly, the skyrocketing number of cases has affected the length of
time it takes for a court to dispose of a case. The amount of time between when
an appellate court received the last appellate brief until it rendered a final deci-
sion more than doubled between 1950 and 1990.239 This rise in caseload has
caused a "serious, systematic delay" in appellate decision-making time.
4
Ironically, proponents of FRAP 32.1 contend that the inability to cite a case is
unfair and in violation of the Constitution.24" ' Yet, an increase in "decision time
from 2.2 to 5.6 months," which burdens "civil litigants for whom delay costs
money or criminal defendants who might be entitled to release if their convic-
tions were reversed," is just as disadvantageous, if not more. 42
C. AUTHOR'S PROPOSED UNIFORM PUBLICATION AND CITATION
PLAN
Standards for determining whether to publish an opinion are frequently criti-
cized as being overbroad.243 In fact, some publication guidelines do not man-
date that publication of opinions meet relevant criteria. 44 Critics fear that this
235 Jones, supra note 210, at 1487 (quoting Learned Hand, Thou Shall not Ration Justice,
Address Before the Legal Aid Society of New York (Feb. 16, 1951), in LEGAL AID BRIEF
CASE, at 3, 5 (1951)).
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 1488.
239 Id. at 1489 (finding that final decisions in 1950 were issued within 2.2 months of
receipt of the final appellate brief but jumped to 5.6 months for cases with oral arguments
and 4.2 months for cases without oral arguments in 1990).
240 Id.
241 See generally discussion supra Part II.
242 Jones, supra note 210, at 1490.
243 POSNER, supra note 151, at 165 (maintaining that these standards "amount to little
more than saying that an opinion should not be published unless it is likely to have value as
precedent").
244 See 1 lTH CIR. R. 36-2 (stating that an "opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority
of the panel decides to publish it"). But see 1ST CIR. Loc. R. 36(b)(1) (establishing a pre-
sumption in favor of publishing opinions).
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amount of discretion leads to a loss of judicial accountability resulting in
judges deciding cases contrary to established precedent.245
Rather than allowing local rules of each circuit to regulate the procedures in
the various courts of appeals, the implementation of a uniform publication
plan2. would keep with the salutary purpose of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and provide a uniform solution. The following is the author's con-
servative proposal for a uniform publication plan.
i. Proposed Rule
Rule 32.1: Publication of Judicial Opinions
(1) Authority. A court of appeals may designate an opinion as unpublished,
non-precedential, not for publication, or the like.
(2) Mandatory Publication. An opinion will be ordered published, and be
treated as precedential, if it:
(a) Establishes a new rule of law;
247
(b) Alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains an existing law;248
(c) Resolves or identifies an apparent conflict of authority, either within
the circuit or between the circuit and another, or creates a conflict be-
tween the circuit and another;249
(d) Concerns an issue of substantial or continuing public interest or impor-
tance;
(e) Is a case of first impression in the court with regard to the substantial
issue it resolves;
2 °




(g) Applies an existing rule of law in a novel factual context, differing ma-
terially from those in previously published opinions of the court apply-
ing the rule;
252
(h) Contributes significantly to the legal literature by reviewing the legisla-
tive, judicial, administrative, or electoral history of an existing rule of
245 Martineau, supra note 15, at 123.
246 See generally Jonathon Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 54 A.B.A.
J. 661 (1968); FED. R. APP. P. 1,47.
247 See, e.g., Fed. CIR. R. App. 10(4); Weresh, supra note 38, at 179.
248 See sources cited supra note 247.
249 See sources cited supra note 247.
250 See, e.g., Fed. CIR. R. App. 10(4); Weresh, supra note 38, at 180.
251 See sources cited supra note 247.




(i) Reverses, modifies, or denies enforcement of a lower court or adminis-
trative agency decision, or affirms it on a substantive ground different
from those previously set forth. 4
(3) Citation Disfavored. An opinion designated as nonprecedential is prohib-
ited from being citied in appellate briefs and opinions. However, an opinion
designated as nonprecedential may be cited to support a claim of claim preclu-
sion, issue preclusion, law of the case, double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct,
abuse of the writ, notice, or entitlement to attorney's fees. Additionally, after
timely notification is given to the opposing party, an unpublished opinion may
be cited for its persuasive value only if a reasonable person in good faith could
conclude that an intra-circuit conflict exists in resolving a material fact in the
case at bar.
(4) Publication Decisions. Opinions of the court shall be published only if
the majority of the judges participating in the decision find that a standard for
publication as set out in section (2) of this rule is satisfied. Concurring opin-
ions shall be published only if the majority opinion is published. Dissenting
opinions may be published if the dissenting judge determines that a standard
for publication as set out in section (2) of this rule is satisfied.255
(5) Collateral Attack. Any person, with good cause, may petition the decid-
ing court to reclassify a nonprecedential opinion. A party that wishes the court
to revisit the case must file their motion within one (1) year of the date of the
decision.256
ii. Comments Regarding Statutory Publication
Section 32.1(1) is a new rule that delegates authority to courts of appeals to
issue unpublished opinions. This rule is merely a codification of the common
practice exercised by the circuits for years. In fact, estimates reveal that 80% of
all opinions issued by the courts of appeals in recent years are unpublished.
2
11
Section 32.1(2) lists the criteria an opinion must meet in order to be deemed
published. An explicit publication policy that prescribes publication in firm
253 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(1); Weresh, supra note 38, at 180.
254 Nichols, Jr., supra note 32, at 925-26; Weresh, supra note 38, at 180.
255 STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 19, at 22.
256 Eloshway, supra note 24, at 646-47.
257 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 2001, tbl.S-3 (2001), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/tables/s03sep01.pdf.
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decisive instances narrows a judge's discretion. 5
Section 32.1(4) requires a majority panel vote to designate an opinion as
published, unless a concurring or dissenting opinion is issued or the lower
court's opinion is vacated or modified. This requirement is already in effect in
various circuits." 9 A majority vote ensures that the decision is one to which the
judges of the panel choose to be bound. This quorum also guarantees that the
panel gives precedential value to only the truly worthy cases. Correct applica-
tion of this rule should limit nonpublication to affirmances where it is reason-
able to conclude that a valid reason for appeal never existed.26°
iii. Comments Regarding Statutory Prohibition on Citation
Section 32.1(3) prohibits the citation of unpublished opinions by an appel-
late court as well as by a litigant to an appellate court except in circumscribed
situations. First, it uniformly codifies the practice of all the circuits that have
allowed citation to unpublished opinions in support of claim preclusion, issue
preclusion, law of the case, double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct, abuse of
the writ, notice, or entitlement to attorney's fees.26' Not all of the circuits have
specifically mentioned all of these claims in their local rules, but it does not
appear that any circuit has ever sanctioned an attorney for citing an unpub-
lished opinion under these circumstances. 62
Section 32.1(3) also allows for citation of unpublished opinions in the rare
instance of an intra-circuit conflict. Simply stated, if conflicting holdings re-
garding an issue of material fact for a litigant exist in the circuit's unpublished
opinions, then the litigant is free to cite to these cases in order to bring the in-
consistency to the attention of the panel. This section puts litigants on notice;
however, that citation can only occur if he or she has a good faith belief as to
the existence of a conflict. The court makes the final decision as to whether or
not an intra-circuit conflict exists.
Of the ten circuits that currently allow citation to unpublished opinions,263
258 STIENSTRA, supra note 100, at 28-29.
259 See sources cited supra note 244.
260 Nichols, Jr., supra note 32, at 926; 11TH CIR. R. 36-1 (stating that the court can issue
an affirmance without an opinion if the court determines any of the following exist: "the
judgment... is based on findings of fact.., not clearly erroneous; the evidence ... is suffi-
cient; the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence . . . ; a
summary judgment, directed verdict, or... pleading[] is supported by the record; the judg-
ment has been entered without reversible error of law").
261 Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report & Analysis,
5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESs 473, 474 n.3 (2003).
262 Id.
263 See discussion supra Part tI.D.
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only one treats them as full-fledged binding precedent: the D.C. Circuit.264 The
remaining circuits differ widely as to the weight they give these opinions.
2 65
Section 32.1(3) intends to replace these conflicting practices as well as codify
what is recognized in the remaining twelve circuits: unpublished opinions are
not binding precedents. Prohibition on citation attempts to level the judicial
playing field. If litigants were able to cite to unpublished opinions without
limitation, those with the fewest resources would be disproportionately disad-
vantaged.266
This rule also urges the circuits to replace the term unpublished opinion with
the term nonprecedential opinion in order to dispel the confusion associated
with these terms.
267
iv. Comments Regarding the Statutory Right to Collaterally Attack a
Designation
Currently, many circuits allow litigants to attack an unpublished opinion.26 8
Section 32.1(5) allows any person to petition the court to change an opinion's
designation. This petitioning option allows the public to decide whether an
opinion is worthy of precedent. With this, judges monitor deviations from the
publication guidelines. The court makes the final decision as to whether or not
the request for publication is for good cause. Good cause is found if the unpub-
lished opinion meets any of the criteria set forth in section 32.1(2). Parties have
one year to attack the publication designation.
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Federal court rulemaking has consistently been a "consensus or near-
consensus process." '269 If the division of the circuits is any indicator, FRAP 32.1
should never have survived the rulemaking process. FRAP 32.1 is a direct at-
tack on judicial efficiency. If judges are forced to implement this rule, one-
264 Id see also D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B).
265 See discussion supra Part I.D.
266 Kozinski Letter, supra note 89, at 13.
267 See discussion supra Parts II.B, lV.A.i-ii.
268 See Letter from the Seventh Circuit, supra note 171.
Our circuit rule 53(d)(3) authorizes any person to move for the publication of any un-
published decision of the court, and these motions are usually granted. The rule could
be strengthened to make clear that if the movant shows that publication would be con-
sistent with the criteria for publication set forth in the rule . . . , the motion shall be
granted; at present the decision whether to grant is discretionary.
Id.
269 ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, 109TH CONG., MINUTES OF SPRING 2004
MEETING 8 (2004) http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0404.pdf
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word dispositions, oral dispositions from the bench, and the time to dispose of
an appeal will rise sharply. Yet, implementation of FRAP 32.1 continues to
ignore the most important issue in the publication-citation debate: the issue of
precedent.
Courts and litigants should continue to recognize two types of opinions: pre-
cedential and unprecedential. Yet, improved technology has made both types
of opinions accessible to those with enough time and money on their hands.
This is exactly the reason why universal citation should be rejected.
The implementation of a specific uniform publication plan address the con-
cerns surrounding the proper designation of precedent. Since proponents of
FRAP 32.1 believe that all decisions have precedential value, they believe it is
unfair and unconstitutional to prevent litigants from citing unpublished opin-
ions. In actuality, the reverse is true. Granting precedence to unpublished opin-
ions creates a systematic unfairness that is directed at the have-nots. With a
uniform publication plan in place, litigants can be comforted by the fact that
precedent is methodically added to existing case law under specific guidelines.
That way, litigants will know they have the authority of the Nation's law on
their lips when they decide to quote a judge.
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